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In a general equilibrium context, we analyze the impact of changes in institutional labor 
market conditions, such as access to financing and efficiency, on the composition of 
employment and unemployment, considering the nature of formal labor contracts and the 
entrepreneurial capacity of the labor force. We extend the Mortensen - Pissarides model to 
allow for two types of formal job contracts: temporary and permanent; and we also allow 
for self-employment. We show that labor market efficiency as well as access to self-
employment financing played a key role in the evolution of employment in Chile during the 





En un contexto de equilibrio general, analizamos el impacto de un cambio en las 
condiciones del mercado laboral, tales como el acceso a financiamiento y la eficiencia del 
mercado, en la composición del empleo y en el desempleo, considerando la naturaleza de 
los contratos de trabajo y la capacidad de emprendimiento de la fuerza laboral. Extendemos 
el modelo de Mortensen - Pissarides para permitir que existan dos tipos de contratos de 
trabajo en el mercado formal: temporales y permanentes; y también permitimos que haya 
empleo por cuenta propia (empleo informal). Encontramos que la eficiencia del mercado 
laboral, así como el acceso al financiamiento de actividades independientes, ha jugado un 
rol clave en la evolución del empleo en Chile durante los últimos 15 años. Además, y 
previsiblemente, las dificultades de acceso al financiamiento afectan al empleo por cuenta 
propia. 
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This paper analyzes the evolution of the Chilean labor market during the 1990s Asian crisis and the
international ﬁnancial crisis in 2008-2009. During the ﬁrst of these crises, the seasonally adjusted
unemployment rate increased almost 5 percentage points, reaching over 10% between May and
December of 1999. On the other hand, the latter event had an slightly smaller impact on output
and unemployment, which increased 2.5 percentage points, reaching over 10% between June and
August 2009. Likewise, the composition of changes in employment was diﬀerent in both of this
episodes. During the initial part of the Asian crisis, self-employed work grew nil while dependent
employment decreased. The late recovery of employment was fuelled by dependent employment.
During the most recent crisis, the negative dependent job growth was hampered by self-employment,
which boosted overall employment growth to positive territory by early 2011. This paper shows
that the diﬀerences in the outcome of the labor market between these two crises cannot be explained
solely by the negative productivity shock the economy faced. Instead, it is necessary to account for
changes in labor market conditions and access to ﬁnancial markets between these episodes.
Several institutional elements, in general, and labor market characteristics, in particular, changed
over the last decade. On the one side, ﬁnancial deepening occurred during this time, as reported
in Zahler (2008), Banco Central de Chile (2009) y Fuenzalida (2009), which implies better access
to funding sources for the development of entrepreneurial activities of diﬀerent sorts. The impact
for individuals (e.g., self-employed workers) was especially important. This change is a possible
explanation as to why, during the worst part of the 2008-2009 crisis, net self-employed job creation
contributed positively to employment, while this was not the case during the Asian crisis.1 Addi-
tionally, a series of policies aimed at labor market ﬂexibility, such as an unemployment insurance
system, where implemented.
Several aspects of the Chilean labor market have been thoroughly studied under a descriptive
and partial equilibrium scope (Bravo et al. 2005, Cowan et al. 2004, C´ espedes and Tokman 2005,
Mart´ ınez et al. 2001). This paper contributes to the literature by proposing a theoretical general
1For a detailed description of the evolution of the labor market, refer to Section 2.
1equilibrium model that allows to quantify the impact of changes in the access to ﬁnancial markets
as well as other institutional changes that aﬀect the functioning of the Chilean labor market under
the context of a negative shock. We extend the model of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) in
which workers are oﬀered one of two types of contracts: temporary and permanent or indeﬁnite
contracts. Under our framework, unemployed agents can choose to work in a self-employed fashion
(Fonseca, L´ opez-Garc´ ıa, and Pissarides 2001, Uren 2007) or join the “formal” labor force. This in
itself is a contribution over other attempts which model informality as an involuntary state (e.g,
Albrecht et al. 2009). The model allows us to analyze the impact of labor market rigidities on its
performance, something which has been documented in a descriptive fashion (e.g, Marinakis 2005).
The model not only allows us to replicate changes in the unemployment rate, but also reallocation
of employment across diﬀerent sectors in the economic cycle.
Once solved for, we calibrate the model for the Chilean economy at two points in time consistent
with the crises described before. We employ micro-data from the National Employment Survey
(ENE in Spanish) and the Social Protection Survey (EPS in Spanish), among other sources. Our
results imply that the increase in the unemployment rate triggered by the international ﬁnancial
crisis was smaller than that of the Asian crisis not only because the productivity shock was presum-
ably smaller, but because labor market conditions diﬀered as well. In this economic environment,
the model shows that self-employment remains stable during the ﬁnancial crisis as long as ﬁnancing
costs for entrepreneurs are smaller than those faced by agents during the Asian crisis. The coun-
terfactual experiments show that worse access to ﬁnancing and a less eﬃcient labor market during
the most recent crisis would have resulted in a higher unemployment rate than the one recorded in
the data.
The rest of the document is organized in the following way. Section 2 describes the Chilean
labor market, putting emphasis in the two crisis episodes of the last decade. The theoretical model
and its stationary equilibrium are derived in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the calibration strategy
and Section 5 the main results and counterfactual exercises. Section 6 concludes.
22 The Chilean labor market
In this section we characterize the Chilean labor market in the 1996-2010 period, stressing the
changes occurred during the two crisis periods. Figure 1 shows the evolution of employment and
unemployment as reported by the National Employment Survey (ENE).2 The seasonally adjusted
unemployment series is shown on panel (a). Before the Asian crisis, the unemployment rate was
below 6%, after which it ﬂuctuated around 10% until 2005. Towards 2007, it decreased three
percentage points. Because of the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007-2008, the unemployment rate surpassed
10%, although towards the end of the period, the ﬁgure displays a faster recovery after the crisis.3
During the same period, the distribution of employed workers between dependent and self-employed
workers has been stable, although the share of the latter group was, on average, four percentage
points lower after the Asian crisis and until mid-2005, as shown on panel (b) of Figure 1.4 In general,
before the Asian crisis and between 2006 and 2008, roughly 70% of the working age population
constituted dependent labor.


















































1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Employed Self employed
(a) Unemployment rate, SA (b) Type of work as a fraction of the Labor Force
Note: Consistent with INE’s methodology, labor force and employed worker series are seasonally adjusted
and the umployed worker series is constructed as a residual.
Source: ENE, Central Bank of Chile.
2The ENE conducted by Instituto Nacional de Estad´ ısticas (2010) ceased to be the oﬃcial employment survey
on February 2010, but it is employed due to its larger span of coverage.
3The New National Employment Survey, which substituted the ENE, conﬁrms this trend towards the end of 2010.
4The “dependent worker” category corresponds to the category of the same name in the ENE survey, while the
“self-employed worker” category corresponds to the rest of occupied workers.
3In spite of the relative stability of the dependent and self-employed workers, their contribution to
the changes in overall employment was diﬀerent between the two crisis episodes, as shown on Figure
2. Prior to the Asian crisis, employment growth was fuelled by self-employment. On the onset of the
crisis, dependent labor dropped rapidly, while the contribution of self-employment slowly decreased.
The recovery process that followed was fuelled by dependent labor growth, while self-employment
had little or no contribution. On the contrary, prior to the ﬁnancial crisis, employment was growing
due to dependent labor growth, whose contribution became negative during the crisis. Nevertheless,
it was self-employment the group whose recovery started earlier and pulled employment growth
upwards until mid-2010. These diﬀerences in the behavior of employment favor the hypothesis that
changes in structural and legal frameworks had an impact on the behavior of labor markets during
the last decade.










































































































Jul Sep Nov 09 Mar May Jul Sep Nov 10
(a) Asian crisis (b) Financial crisis
(Jul 97-Feb 99) (Jul 08-Feb 10)
Note: Gray line: employment growth rate; white bars: impact of self-employed worker growth; dark
bars: impact of dependent worker growth.
Source: Constructed from the ENE.
Moreover, the composition of dependent workers according to the nature of their contracts (tem-
porary versus permanent) display changes that appear to be consistent with changes in the social
protection schemes. While this distinction is not available from the ENE survey,5 this information
5The New National Employment Survey identiﬁes the temporary nature of contracts. Unfortunately, its coverage
is only recent and does not allow for the study of labor market behavior over diﬀerent economic cycles.
4may be obtained from the Social Protection Survey, conducted by the Pension Supervisor. Figure
3 shows that in the period that followed the Asian crisis, the fraction of workers with temporary
contracts increased in approximately 5 percentage points. This could be explained by labor market
institutions that are relatively more rigid (see Bentolila, Cahuc, Dolado, and Le Barbanchon (2009)
for a comparison between Spain and France) and high ﬁring costs for permanent workers.
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1980q1 1986q1 1992q1 1998q1 2004q1
Permanent workers Temporary workers Unemployed workers
Note: Seasonally adjusted.
Source: Authors’ calculations with data from the Social Protection Survey, Pension Supervisor.
The model developed in the next section aims at explain the origin of the data regularities
described in this section.
3 Model
3.1 Economic Environment
In this section we present the search model employed to describe the Chilean labor market. It
is based on Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) model with endogenous job destruction to allow for
the distinction between temporary and permanent jobs entailing diﬀerent dismissal costs. Within
5employed workers, the model allows for dependent or wage-earning workers and self-employed or
independent ones.
We assume there is a mass one of inﬁnitely-living agents. Like ﬁrms, workers are risk-neutral
and discount future utility at rate r. Although workers are assume to be identical within the “for-
mal,” wage-earning market, they have a type ρ which identiﬁes them according to their productivity
level in the self-employed or independent sector. This productivity level comes from an ability dis-
tribution G(ρ) deﬁned between [ρ,ρ]. This assumption will have an impact on the self-employment
decision certain workers take, as we argue later on.
Firms must pay a cost h to keep a vacancy open. When ﬁlled, the worker-ﬁrm pair yields ε units
of production for which the worker gets paid a salary w(ε). The worker-ﬁrm relationship is identiﬁed
by an idiosyncratic productivity shock ε ∼ F(ε), distributed in the [ε,ε] interval. The shock arrives
according to a Poisson process with parameter μ. To simplify our analysis, and following Bentolila
et al. (2009), we assume that all new jobs are created with the maximum productivity level, ε.
Both types of wage-earning (dependent) jobs – temporary and permanent – are subject to the
same idiosyncratic shock process, but diﬀer in two important aspects. First, temporary workers
cannot bargain for their wages, implying that temporary wages are not function of the match
speciﬁc. A temporary job opportunity arrives with probability p, and ends exogenously with
probability λ. At this time, the employer chooses whether to turn it into a new permanent job
or to destroy it at not cost for the employer or worker. Second, if an employer decides to end a
permanent job, she must pay a ﬁring cost f, deﬁned in terms of the previous period’s wage. All
workers who are unemployed have the option of receiving unemployment insurance payments of b,
also a function of the previous period’s wage.6
Unlike other papers in the literature, where the “informal” sector is modelled as an involuntary
state (see, for example Albrecht et al. 2009), workers in this environment choose between seeking for
employment in the formal sector or working independently (self-employed) in the informal sector.
6As argued in the previous section, they payments will be zero during the Asian crisis, and positive in the latter
crisis, since no unemployment insurance was available during the ﬁrst period.
6When a worker chooses to latter, she must pay a cost c related to this activity. Workers are identiﬁed
by an ability level, orthogonal to the productivity shock, which projects on the managerial abilities
of self-employed workers. This ability is summarized by the parameter ρ.
Labor market frictions are summarized in the matching function m(u,v), as in Pissarides (2000),
where the matching rate q(θ) for ﬁrms with open vacancies and θq(θ) for unemployed agents. Labor
market tightness is summarized in the parameter θ = v/u, where u is level of unemployment and
v the number of available vacancies in the economy.
We consider an environment where wages are semi-rigid. This means that wages are calculated
in pre-crisis equilibrium periods and maintained during crisis periods. Hence, wages for diﬀerent
types of contracts reﬂect initial conditions. However, overall wage payments vary as the fractions
of workers in each type of contract changes at the onset of the slowdown.
3.2 Bellman equations
Summarizing the discussion of the previous subsection, agents can be in one of the following cate-
gories: employed in the formal sector (as a dependent worker), self-employed in the informal sector,
or unemployed (U). In the formal sector, workers are employed as a dependent worker with a per-
manent contract (Wp), a new permanent contract (W0), or a temporary or ﬁxed-term contract
(Wt).
We next show the Bellman equations for workers in each of the states listed above. First, we
must note that a worker chooses between looking for a job in the formal sector or becoming self-
employed. Were she to choose the latter, she remains unemployed until she receives a job oﬀer.
Hence, the value of been unemployed is given by
r U(ρ)=max{ρε − c,b + θq(θ)[p(Wt(ε,ρ) − U(ρ) )+( 1− p)(W0(ε,ρ) − U(ρ))]}.
The above condition can be divided into two, depending on the value ρ takes. More speciﬁcally,
7since the ﬁrst term in the expression is monotonically increasing in ρ, it can be inferred that there
exists a value ρ  above which no worker will opt to engage in the formal sector, and will always
choose to do so below it.7 From the vantage point of a worker who has chosen to participate in the
“formal” market, the value of ρ is irrelevant since it does not aﬀect her productivity. Consequently,
her valuation of the diﬀerent states does not depend on her type ρ in this case. Hence, the value
of unemployment for any worker can be written as the value this state has for a worker who chose
to participate in the “formal” sector. Thus, the Bellman equations for the diﬀerent states are:








max{Wp(x) − W0(ε),U− W0(ε)}dF(x) (1c)







max{W0(x) − Wt(ε),U− Wt(ε)}dF(x) (1d)
In equation 1a, the unemployed worker receives the unemployment beneﬁt, that is a function of
previous wage, and with probability θq(θ) the unemployed worker match a ﬁrm, in which case the
job becomes a transitory one with probability p or permanent otherwise. Workers at a permanent
job, as described in equation 1b receives their wage compensation that is a function of the current
productivity level ε, with probability μ another productivity shock arrives and the match may be
destroyed if does not generate a positive surplus. If the new productivity level is high enough, the
worker ﬁrm pair is not destroyed. The case for the worker at a new permanent job is identical.
Workers at a temporary job (1d), does not negotiate wages, so their wage is not a function of current
productivity level, with probability μ another productivity shock arrives and the match may be
destroyed if does not generate a positive surplus. If the new productivity level is high enough, the
7In the most general case, it can be argued that there exists a set of values of ρ for which this condition is
satisﬁed. Nevertheless, the empirical results suggest that the strict monotonicity assumption is satisﬁed for a large
set of parameter values.
8worker ﬁrm pair is not destroyed. The temporary job ends with probability λ, in which case is
evaluated to destroy the match at no cost or to hire the worker in a permanent contract.
It should be noted that ρ  is an element of the equilibrium, as we show when discussing the
market clearing conditions.
Firms are interested in the value of a vacancy depending on whether it is empty (V ) or ﬁlled
by a temporary worker (Jt), a permanent worker (Jp), or a new permanent worker (J0). Hence,
the value can be written as:
rV = −h + q(θ)(p(Jt(ε) − V )+( 1− p)(J0(ε) − V )) (2)
As we argued before, this value is independent of the type ρ of the worker (as are the remaining
Bellman equations for the ﬁrms). Firms have to pay cost h for keeping open a vacancy, with
probability q(θ) they match to a worker and with probability p the realized match is for a temporary
job or, with probability 1−p for a new permanent job. The value of the ﬁrm ﬁlled with a temporary
or permanent jobs are the following:






max{J0(x) − Jt(ε),V − Jt(ε)}dF(x) (2a)
rJp(ε)= ε − wp(ε)+μ
 ε
ε
max{Jp(x) − Jp(ε),V − Jp(ε) − f}dF(x) (2b)
rJ0(ε)= ε − w0(ε)+μ
 ε
ε
max{Jp(x) − J0(ε),V − J0(ε) − f}dF(x) (2c)
Firms ﬁlled with temporary jobs obtain the match productivity and pay a wage wt. A new
productivity shock arises with probability μ in which case the match may be dissolved if there is
no surplus to share. Temporary jobs ends with probability λ and forms decided between to create
a new permanent job or destroy the match at no cost. Firms ﬁlled with a permanent job receives
the match productivity level and pay a negotiated wage that depends on worker productivity, as
9temporary jobs, with probability μ a new productivity level arises and ﬁrms decide between to
continue or destroy the match paying a cost f that is a function of worker previous wage level.
3.3 Stationary equilibrium
From equation (2), we derive the ﬁrm free-entry condition that guarantees that the value of a







[pJt(ε)+( 1− p)J0(ε) ]=0
⇒ h =q(θ)[pJt(ε)+( 1− p)J0(ε)] (3)
From (1b) and (1c), and from (2b) and (2c), respectively, we obtain:
r[Wp(ε) − W0(ε)] = wp(ε) − w0(ε),
r[Jp(ε) − J0(ε)] = wp(ε) − w0(ε),
which provides a relationship between the values of existing permanent jobs and new permanent
jobs for workers and ﬁrms, which will be useful further ahead:
Wp(ε) − W0(ε)=J0(ε) − Jp(ε). (4)
Workers and ﬁrms bargain for wages under a Nash bargaining scheme. The objective is to
split the surplus arising from the worker-ﬁrm pair. This surplus, according to the diﬀerent type of
contracts is equal to:
St(ε)=Jt(ε) − V + Wt(ε) − U (5a)
S0(ε)=J0(ε) − V + W0(ε) − U (5b)
Sp(ε)=Jp(ε) − V + f + Wp(ε) − U (5c)
10We assume the workers’ bargaining power is β ∈ (0,1) (ﬁrms’ power is 1−β), such that they obtain
a fraction β (ﬁrms obtain a fraction 1 − β) of the surplus from the negotiation. Hence, from (3)
and the surplus bargaining, we obtain:
hθ
1 − β
= θq(θ)[pSt(ε)+( 1− p)S0(ε)]. (3 )








{−h + q(θ)[pJt(ε)+( 1− p)J0(ε)]} (2 )
Adding these two terms and using the deﬁnition for the worker and ﬁrm surpluses, we have:





























This condition, together with (1a )a n d( 2  ), into the ﬁrms’ Bellman equation (2b) yields the surplus
conditions as a function of productivity shocks:
(r + μ)Sp(ε)=ε + μ
 ε
ε




(r + μ)S0(ε)=ε + μ
 ε
ε




where the second equation employed the Sp(ε) − S0(ε)=f condition, which comes from the
11surpluses and equation (4).
Let Sp(ε) = 0, then (7a) becomes the long-term job destruction condition:
(r + μ)Sp(εd)=0=εd + μ
 ε
εd




where εd is the productivity threshold such that pairs with productivity levels ε<ε d are
destroyed. Likewise, with S0(εc) = 0, (7b) becomes the long-term job creation condition:
(r + μ)S0(εc)=0=εc + μ
 ε
εd




where the productivity level εc is such that pairs with productivity ε>ε d are proﬁtable enough
for a job to be created. From these two expressions, we obtain a relationship between the job
creation and job destruction productivity thresholds (εc and εd):
εc = εd +( r + μ)f (8)
Substituting (LTJD) and (LTJC) into (7a) and (7b), respectively, results in and expression for








;ε ≥ εc (9b)






dF(x) − rf + b +
βθh
(1 − β)
; ε ≥ εd. (10)
12Next, substitute (10) into the integrated version in the of [ε,ε]i n t e r v a lo f :













































We next derive expressions for the diﬀerent wages in the economy. From the surplus maximiza-
tion problems, we obtain the following ﬁrst order conditions (which are satisﬁed with equality when
they bind):
(1 − β)[Wt(ε) − U]=β [Jt(ε) − V ],
(1 − β)[W0(ε) − U]=β [J0(ε) − V ],
(1 − β)[Wp(ε) − U]=β [Jp(ε) − V ].
Substituting the Bellman equations for workers and ﬁrms, along with (6) and after some alge-
braic manipulation, we obtain wage expressions for temporary (wt), new permanent (w0(ε)), and
existing permanent wages (wp(ε)):
wt = β (ε + hθ)+( 1− β)b, (12a)
w0(ε)=β (ε − μf + hθ)+( 1− β)b, (12b)
wp(ε)=β (ε + rf + hθ)+( 1− β)b. (12c)
13Along with wages for each type of contract, we need to compute the mass of labor participation
in each group in order to determine the average wages in the economy. These values are key
to determine ﬁring costs and unemployment beneﬁts (which are functions of wages). With this
objective in mind, we ﬁrst analyze the net changes (ﬂows into minus ﬂows out from each state)
in the number of workers with temporary contracts (Nt), existing permanent contracts (Np), new
permanent contracts (N0), and temporary contracts converted into permanent contracts which have
not received a new productivity shock (N0t). These are given by:
˙ Nt = puθq(θ) − λNt
˙ Np =( 1− p)uθq(θ)+λNt[1 − F(εc)] − μNpF(εd)
˙ N0 =( 1− p)uθq(θ) − μN0
˙ N0t = λNt[1 − F(εc)] − μN0t






















Given these expressions, we can write the steady state unemployment rate as:





λμF(εd)+θq(θ)[λ(1 − pF(εc)) + pμF(εd)]
(14)
where the ex-ante probability that a worker is in the self-employment sector is p ≡ P[ρ<ρ  ]. The
ﬁrst line in (14) says that the fraction of unemployed workers is equal to the measure of workers
minus those with temporary contracts and permanent contracts. The second lines employs (13a)
and (13b). Hence, the economy’s average wage, which corresponds to the weighted average of wages












4 Data and calibration
In this section we describe the data sources employed (used to characterize the Chilean labor market
in Section 2) and the model’s calibration strategy.
4.1 Data
We use diﬀerent micro-data sources to calibrate the model. The main data sources are: the national
employment survey (Encuesta Nacional de Empleo, ENE), the Social Protection Survey (Encuesta
de Protecci´ on Social, EPS), and data from the Statistics Center of Pension Supervisor of Chile.
The National Employment Survey (ENE) is conducted by the National Statistic Institute (INE)
and corresponds to a monthly survey that generates employment series by moving quarters, which
interview 36,000 households. The survey is developed under international standards deﬁned by the
ILO in cooperation with the OECD. This survey was the oﬃcial one until February 2010, when
was replaced by a new survey, which is not useful for our study due to its short lifespan.
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Lambda: Temporary job duration









1980q1 1986q1 1992q1 1998q1 2004q1
Lambda: Temporary job duration
P: probability to find a temporary job
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Average tenure at laid off (no quits or retirement), months
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Average tenure at laid off (no quits or retirement), months
Average tenure at laid off (months)
(c) Average employment duration (in months)
Source: Constructed with data from the Social Protection Survey, Superindency of Social Prevision. Trend, HP ﬁlter.
16The Social Protection Survey (EPS) is a panel survey developed by the Department of Social
Protection which interviews and follows a group of people on a bi-yearly basis (2002, 2004 and 2006).
We construct labor market dynamics for the sample using EPS. The survey contains information
about 20,000 individuals and it is representative at a national level. From this survey we obtain
information on labor market history, which allows us to generate unemployment durations and
ﬁring costs. Figure 4 shows selected statistics obtained from the sample employed in the model
calibration.
Finally, the Pension Supervisor reports monthly information on the unemployment insurance
coverage. The data allow us to estimate the average unemployment beneﬁt, as a function of previous
wages for permanent workers. Temporary workers are not eligible for the unemployment beneﬁts
in Chile. Figure 5 shows the average unemployment beneﬁt payment as a fraction of the workers
last earnings.
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Original serie
SA serie
Source: Constructed with information from the Retirment Funds Superindency.
4.2 Calibration
In this section we describe the procedure to calibrate the model described in Section 3. There are
16 parameters that require calibration. We divide the parameter space into three subsets. The
17ﬁrst one corresponds to the set of parameters that we directly impose in to the model. These come
from values that are standard and widely used in the literature. The second set corresponds to
parameters that are directly estimated from the data. Finally a set of parameters that are selected
so that the model matches some important moments observed in the data. In particular, we are
interested in the unemployment rate and the fraction of temporary workers, among others. The
model is calibrated such that a period corresponds to one quarter.
We calibrate the model for two episodes of time considered as periods of “normal” economic
growth, both of which were followed by economic slowdowns. As mentioned earlier, these correspond
to the Asian and the ﬁnancial crisis.
The parameter values we impose directly to the model, that do not change between the two
periods are shown on Table 1. The quarterly interest rate is ﬁxed at 1%. We deﬁne the matching
function as a Cobb-Douglas function, following the standard Hosios condition (Hosios 1990). We
set the matching function elasticity with respect to unemployment (α) equal to the Nash bargaining
power (β). As is standard in the literature, we set both values equal to 0.5, Rogerson, Shimer,
and Wright (2005). For simplicity we assume a uniform distribution for the matched worker-ﬁrm
idiosyncratic shock. We normalize the maximum value of the shock equal to 1.
Table 1: Imposed parameters
Parameter Value Description
r 0.01 Quarterly interest rate
β 0.5 Worker bargaining power
α 0.5 Matching unemployment elasticity
ε 1.0 Normalization
The parameter set estimated from the data is shown on Table 2. As mentioned in the previous
subsection, the unemployment beneﬁt (b) is calibrated considering the average coverage since the
program inception (October 2002). Hence, the parameter b is set to be equal to zero during the ﬁrst
period analyzed, and equal to 0.3 (1 month of compensation per quarter) for the second period.
The parameter λ captures the probability that a temporary job converts into a permanent one or
get destroyed, meaning corresponds to the average duration for a temporary job. The labor market
18legislation in Chile requires that each permanent-contract worker who is ﬁred must be compensated
in an amount equal to one month of his wages per year of tenure (with a 11-year cap). From the
EPS, we ﬁnd that the average tenure for people who have been ﬁred in the period under analysis
is close to 60 months.
Table 2: Estimated Parameters
Parameter 98-Period 08-Period Description
b 0.000 0.300 Unemployment insurance
f 1.886 1.439 Firing Cost
p 0.433 0.559 Temporary job probability
λ 0.043 0.074 Temporary job duration
Finally, the parameters shown on Table 3 are calibrated such that the model matches the un-
employment rate and the share of self-employed workers. More speciﬁcally, the support of the
distribution of ρ and the cost of engaging in self-employment, related to the degree of accessibility
to ﬁnancing, c, are calibrated to be consistent with the fraction of self-employed workers as we
discussed in Section 2 and showed in Figure 4 (a). We check the performance of the model by com-
paring its predictions regarding the destruction rate of permanent jobs, the fraction of temporary
temporary contracts in the economy, and the transition rate between temporary and permanent
jobs.
For the crisis periods, we adjust the productivity shock distribution and other parameters
related to the associated productivity drop. Table 4 shows the estimated moments in the data and
the model for diﬀerent periods.8
5 Results and counterfactual exercises
We next discuss the counterfactual exercises performed to quantify the eﬀects of changes in struc-
tural conditions of the economy on labor market outcomes. The analysis concentrates on the in-
8Given the marked heterogeneities in the individuals, which are absent in the model, we consider a sample
restricted to those workers between 25 and 55 years of age. This allows us to disregard issues such as youth unem-
ployment and retirement decisions, which are absent from the model.
19Table 3: Calibrated Parameters(1)
Parameter 1998 Period 2008 Period
pre-crisis crisis pre-crisis crisis
Vacancy creation cost h 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
Matching eﬃciency parameter m0 0.435 0.435 0.435 0.435
Productivity shock arrival rate μ 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Self-employment startup cost c 0.123 0.123 0.057 0.057
Max. productivity level ε 1.000 0.536 1.000 0.870
Min. productivity level ε 0.360 0.000 0.400 0.245
(1) Parameters rounded to three decimal places.
Table 4: Model results vs. data
(percentage rates)
Period Data(1) Model
u 1 − P(ρ) u 1 − P(ρ)
Pre-Asian crisis 4.40 21.90 4.36 21.53
(1998Q2)
Asian crisis 8.74 22.04 8.73 10.03
(1999Q3)
Pre-Financial crisis 6.36 19.29 6.36 18.60
(2008Q2)
Financial crisis 8.66 19.37 8.65 19.14
(2009Q3)
(1) Values correspond to the three-month average of the
unemployment (u) and self-employment (1 − P(ρ)) rates for
the 25-55 year-old population.
teractive eﬀects of a larger proportion of temporary jobs, labor market rigidities, ﬁnancial aspects,
among others.
Initially, we analyze the eﬀects of productivity shocks on employment. We simulate the ﬁnancial
crisis, incorporating the productivity shocks of the Asian crisis of the 1990s. This exercise allows
us to identify how the economy would have reacted given a diﬀerent economic downturn. Ceteris
20paribus, the unemployment rate would have increased by more than 13 percentage points, given the
more severe nature of the crisis lived in the ﬁrst episode. Additionally, the economy would have
seen less temporary workers and a lower transition rate from temporary to permanent jobs would
have occurred as shown in the second row of Table 5.
The second exercise leaves the productivity parameters as they were calibrated for the ﬁnancial
crisis, but restricting the labor market conditions to be as they were during the Asian crisis. This
exercise allows us to understand what is the impact of the labor market reforms implemented after
the Asian crisis on the performance of the economy. In particular, we analyze the impact of higher
ﬁring costs (given a longer average tenure of the labor force during the Asian crisis), non-existent
unemployment insurance during the ﬁnancial crisis and lower proportion of temporary job creation
contracts on the economy. In this case, the unemployment rate would have increase to close to
7.6%, about 1 percentage point below the recorded ﬁgure for that period, as shown in the third row
of Table 5. This comes along with a larger fraction of self-employed workers than actually recorded.
In fact, this excess self-employment actually oﬀsets the lower unemployment ﬁgures. We conclude
then, that a more rigid labor market results in more workers leaving the formal sector altogether
in favor of self-employment.
In the third exercise, we simulate the ﬁnancial crisis with the access to ﬁnancial markets pa-
rameter c equal to that calibrated for the Asian crisis (that is, with higher cost of engaging in
self-employment activities). The fourth row of Table 5 shows selected parameters for this exercise.
With higher cost to engage in self-employment, fewer workers would have opted for this option
(compared to the eﬀective number) and the crisis would have generated an increase in unemploy-
ment by almost 4 percentage points.
From the previous exercises we can draw a number of conclusions. Productivity shocks play a key
role explaining the evolution of the labor market given the crisis, but they have to be understood in
the context of the underlying institutional and legal conditions. Stringent labor market conditions
favor self-employment, as workers beneﬁt more from informal activities than unemployment (and
the expectation of obtaining a new job). Finally, the improvements in the access to ﬁnancial markets
21Table 5: Counterfactual scenarios
(percentage rates)
Scenario Unemp. 1 − P(ρ) Perm. job Temp. emp. Temp-to-perm
rate destr. rate rate trans. rate
Pre-ﬁnancial crisis 6.36 18.60 2.42 16.10 3.80
Productivity shocks 19.46 14.28 3.52 26.33 2.18
Labor mkt. condts. 7.64 20.59 2.98 23.17 1.75
Access to ﬁn. mkts 10.25 4.19 2.79 19.78 3.25
Financial crisis 8.65 19.14 2.79 19.78 3.25
(measured by the cost of engaging in self-employment c) have proven key to keep the unemployment
rate low in the most recent crisis. In fact, this element’s unemployment-hampering eﬀect oﬀsets
the impact of “more ﬂexible” labor market norms, according to our exercise.
6 Conclusions
This paper has analyzed how productivity shocks have aﬀected employment in Chile in the context
of changes in the ﬁnancing conditions, structure of labor market institutions and labor market
dynamics. Product of the Asian crisis of the 1990s, the unemployment rate remained high for a
long period of time, while after the recent ﬁnancial crisis the unemployment rate reached a slightly
lower unemployment rate, which decreased fairly fast afterwards. Along with these events, the
composition of the changes in employment was diﬀerent between both crisis. While the recovery
after the Asian crisis was fuelled by dependent (formal) job creation, the recovery at the onset
the ﬁnancial crisis occurred because of self-employment job recovery. While the diﬀerences in
magnitude of the productivity shocks is partly responsible for these diﬀerences, our ﬁndings point
at the fact that substantial changes to labor market regulations and access to ﬁnancing are elements
that cannot be disregarded as explanations for the diﬀerent evolution of employment.
This paper contributes to the literature by proposing a theoretic, general equilibrium model
that allows us to analyze the impact of these structural changes on the Chilean labor market.
The model is an extension of the Mortensen-Pissarides model, based on Bentolila et al. (2009)
22and it is calibrated using micro-data obtained from the National Employment Survey (ENE) y
the Social Protection Surveys (EPS). By allowing for diﬀerent types of labor contracts (temporary
and permanent) and diﬀerent forms of work (formal or wage-earning jobs, and self-employment),
it is possible to match changes in labor market aggregates during the two crises. A combination of
diﬀerences in productivity shocks, institutional arrangements, and ﬁnancing access conditions are
required to explain the diﬀerences between the Asian and ﬁnancial crises.
A number of extensions can be considered for this paper. Most notably, self-employment is
overly sensitive to the productivity drop of the Asian crisis, although it is fairly stable in the data.
An alternative approach to deal with this problem is to analyze the behavior of a dynamic version
of the model presented here, where shocks are introduced along a steady state. This approach
exceeds the scope of this paper and is left to be pursued in future research.
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